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:~ cooperatire garae with transferahle utilities or simplt~ a Ti'-game- describes a sit-
uation in tvhich players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. :1 solution concept
for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of
payoffs over the players in the garne. Well-knotvn solution concepts for TL~-garrtes are
the Shapley c~alue and the Banzhaf value. 'Ihe Shapley value is ef6cicnt, i.e. the total
pay.off is eqnal to the worth of the `grand coalition', but the Banzhaf aalue is not efh-
cient. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share funetiorrs, being functions
~chich assign to every player in a TL'~-garne its share in the worth of the grand coalition.
'hhe Shapley (respecticcly Banzhaf) share funct,ion is the share function giving to each
pla;~er his Shapley (Banzhaf) valuc divicíed by the sum of the Shaplev (Banzhaf) calues
o~er all players.
In this paper we consider cooperative games in which the players are organized
into a coalition str~uchure being a linitc partition of the set of players. ~1 value function
for games iu coalition structure has been proposed by Owen. The Owen ralue can
bc considered as a direct generalization of the Shapley. ~~alue to games in coalition
structure. 41'e define ihe Owen share function as the share function for games in
coalition structnre giving to each play.er his Owen value divided by the sum of the
O~ren calues o~er all plavers. ~~'e then show lhat this Otven sharc function satisfies a
rnidtiplirity prnperty, namcly tha,t thc Owen share of a player in a coalit,ion within the
coalition structure is equal to the product of the Shapley. share of the coalition in a
first le~el game between the coalitions within the coafition structure ancí the Shapley
sharc~ of the pla~-er in a~econcí Ic~ve,l game between the play.ers within the coalition.
~~~e shotv that analogously a 13anzhaf share function for games with coalition structure
ean be obtained by defining the share of a player in some coalition as the product
of the I3anzhaf share oC the coalition in a first level game beta.een the coalitions and
the F3anzhaf share of the pla~.er in a second le~~el game bet~ceen the players within the
coalition. "1'he application of the coalition structure share functions to simple majority
games shows sorne appealing properties of these functions.1 Introduction
A situation in ~chich a finite set of n agents can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation
can be cíescribed by a cooperatir~e game with transjerable utilities -or simply a T['-
game- bcing a pair (,~",v), v,.here the finite: set of players .1~' is defined by the set
:~~ -{1,...,n} representing the agents and where v:2~~ -. ]ft such that v(0) - 0 is
the rhoracteristicfunction yielding for any subset S of N the payoff v(S) that can be
achieved by coalition S. Throughout the paper ~ce use the notation ~S~ for the number
of players in coalition S C~~'.
In this paper we only consider monotone TU-games. .~ TL~-game (N, ~~) is
monotone if v(~) c v(F) for all E C F C:v. The class of all monotone Tli-games
is denoted by G. tiote that nufl games (.V',vo) defiued by vo(E) - 0 for all E C N
are rnonotone. In man}~ applications we may~ restrict ourselves to the subclass C~~ -
{(:~'. ~.) c C ~ ~ i. ~ vo} of all monotone non-null games. Observe that v( ~N) ~(1 fnr any
(.~~, v) E~o. The restriction of a game (N, v) E~ to a coa}ition 7' C .N is the ~T~-player
game (7', r~T) with the characteristic function zT on T defined by vT(E) - i~(E) for a}l
f~CT.
a~i~alue funclioa for monotone games is a function f that assigns to every n-
play-er game (-~r,v) E~ an n-dimensional real vector f(N,r) E IE3". This vector can
bc seen as a distribution of payroffs over the individual players in the game. Two
~cr~ll-kno~cn value functions are the Shupley value (Shapley (19~3)) and the Banzhaf
r~ulue (Banzhaf (196~)). A solution concept f is called ef~r,ient if for every Tli-garne
(~V,i,) it exactly distributes the payoff that can be obtained by the 'grand coalition'
.~' consisting of all players, i.e. if for e~very ~1'U-game (iV,v) it holds that t.he sum of
the components of f(N,v) ís equal to 0(:1~). The Shapley value is indeed efficicnt,
but the Banzhaf calue is not. To apply the latter concept in distributing v(N) we
can use the norvnalized Banzhnf vulue which distributes the value v(,V) of the grand
coalition proportional to the Banr.haF values of the players. For a characterization of
the normalized f3anzhaf value ~ce refer to van den Brink and van der Laart (1995).
A nea. ty.pe of solution concepts has been introducecí in van der Laan and van
den 13rink (199a), namely the concept of share funetions. A share function assigns to
Ie~.ery player in a Tt. -game (A~, u) his share in the worth of the grancí coalition. In
their paper van der Laan and van cíen Brink provide an axiomatic c}raracterization of
a class of share functions containing the Shapley share function and the 13anzhaf share
function as special cases. The Shapley (respectively Banzhaf) share funetion is the
share function satisfying that for any player the share of this player mulLiplied wilh
the payoff of the grand coalition is equal to the payoff of this player assigned to him
by the Shapley value (respectively the norrnalized Banzhaf valuc).
Share Functions yield a distribution of the worth of the grand coalition reflecting
the individual batgaining position of the players. In this paper we consider situations
in which the grand coalition forms in order to maximize the total payoff, but in which
t he players are also organized into smaller coalitions. These coalitions form a conlitioa
str2~cture being a finite partition into disjunct subsets of the player set ,'V and are
assurned to be given exogenously. :1s motivated by Vl'inter (1989), the coalitions can
be seen as pressure groups for the ciivision of a(~1'). So, to divide the value of the grand
coalition over all players, first thís value is distributed over the coalitions in the a priori
given coalition structure and then the payoff assigned to a coalition is distributed over
all it, players.
For games in a priori given coalition structure P-{ P~. ..., P} of m coalitions
se~-eral ~.alue functions have been proposed in the lit.erature. The ~umann-Drèze value
assigns to any player in a coalitiou Pk E P the Shapley calue of the restriction of
the game (,~', u) to coalition Pk, see rlumann and Drèze (19i4). Cnder this value
concept, the total value of the players within a coalition P~ is equal to the worth of
this coafition and thcrefore the total payoff is equal to ~k~ c(Pk), rehich need not to be
eyual to r(:~'). According to the Aumaun-Drèze value, the payoff to a player i in some
coalition Pk does not depend upon his contribution to any coalition containing players
outside Pk. In fact, it is supposed that the grand coalition is not formed but that
the players agree to disagree and are satisfied wíth coopcration within the coalitions
Pk, k- 1, ..., m. However, one can imagine many situations in which players form
coalitions within the grand coalition. In such situations it is very reasonable that
also the outside opportunities of the members of a coalition have to be taken into
account. .-~s argued by e.g. Ilart and Iíurz (1983) the existence of a coalition structure
~implies a two-level interaction between the players. Firstly. the worth of the grand
coalition is distributed arnongst the coalitions; secoudly the payoff to each coalition is
distributed amongsk the players within this coalition. The outcomc of such a two-level
int,eraction is reflect,ed by the so-called roalition structure r,alve introduced by Owen
(1977). The Owen coalition structure value has the property that the total payoff of
the players in a coalition Pk is equal to the Shapley value of the coalition Pk, when this
coalition is considered to be a player in the first level game between the coalitions. As a
consequence we have that the Owen value can be considered as a direct genera~lization
of the Shapley value to games in coalition structure.
Analogously to the Owen generalization of the Shapley value, in this paper we
want to generalize the Banzhaf value for games in coalition structure by applying the
idca of share functions as introduced in van der Laan and van den Brink (1998). To
do so we will redefine the Owen value as a coalition structure sharefunction. We then
show that the llwen share ot a player a E!'k in the worth of the grand coalition is eyual
to the Shapley share of coalition Pk in the first level game between the coalitions times
the Shapley share of player i in an appropriately defined second level game between
the players in Pti. In the same way we will define the Banzhaf share of a player i E Pk
in the ~rorth of the grand coalition as the Banzhaf share of coalition Pk in the first
leael game tirnes the Banzhaf share of player i in an appropriately defined second level
game.
Chis paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the concept of
share functions and state the main result given iu van der Laau and van den Brink
(199r). in section 3 we consider games in coalition structure and redefine the Owen
values for games in coalition structure as a share function. ~',re show that this Owen
sharc function satisfies the above mentioned multiplicity property. Analogouslv we
define a Banzhaf share function for games in coalition structure and show some of its
properties. FinaBy in section 4 we apply the Owen and the Banzhaf coalition structure
share function to simple majority games in coalition structure. This application of the
coalition structure share functions shows some appealing properties of these functions.2 Share functions
In this section we recall the concept of share functions as introduced in van der Laan
and ~an den Brink ( 1998). First, given a game (.ti', v) E G, for all E C:V and all i E E.
let na~,.(r1', a) - v(E) - a(F ~{i}) be the marginal contribution of player i to coalition
F, in game (N, v). Then the well-known Shapley ualue ~s and the Banzlzaf value y~B
on the class ~ of monotone games are the functions defined by










The Shapley value is characterized by the well-known axioms of efficiency, linearity,
the cíunmiy player property and anonymity. Axiomatizations of the Banzhaf value
have been given by e.g. Lehrer (1988) and Haller (1994). In the latter contribution it
has been shown that the Banzhaf value satisfies linearity, the dummy player property,
anonymity and the proxy agreement property. The latter property says that the sum
of the payoffs of t~co players does not change if one of thern acts as a proxy for the
other. Since the Banzhaf value is not efficient, this value is not adequate in allocating
the calue v(N) of the `grand coalítion'. More precisely, summation over all components
of the vector :p~(N, v) gives
~ ~,~H(:V, c,) - ~ ~ .r~ r ~É~~~,r') - ~ .~-r ~ ~2~~~ - n)v~E),
~t.`' it V sC.V " ECN
E~t
which is generically not equal to a(.V). :~ote that ~EC,v(2~E~ - n)v(E) ~ 0 and hence
~,E~.YB(~1'. v) 1 0 when (N, u) E~o. Since y~B(N,vo) - 0 for all i E .N, we have that
.,,8 satisfies efficiency on the subclass of null games. To divide the worth of the grand
coalition according to the Banzhaf value, on the class of non-null games we have to
replace the Banzhaf value by the normalized Banzhaf value, being the value function
yJ~ given by
r ~n-r ~, `~
~B~ ~'~) - ~E~,~.(~I~I - n)v~E) ~B~N' ")~ r E N, ~N,,,~ E 40.
~Thc normalized Banzhaf value .pB( N, u) is an efFicient value function that distributes
the worth u(N) of the grand coalition proportional to the Banzhaf values of the players.
"I'he normalized Banzhaf value satisfies anonymity. Ilowever, it does not satisfy linear-
ity, the dummy player property and the proxy agreement property. An axiomatization
of the normalized Banzhaf value has been given in van den Brink and van der Laan
(19rJ5).
An altcrnative approach to divide the worth of the grand coalition amongst its
playcrs is given by the concept of share function introduced by van der Laan and van
den Brink (1998). A share function assigns to each player his share in the worth of the
grand coalition, i.e. a share function on the class ~ of monotone games is a function p
on G giving player i E N the share p;(N,v) in the worth v(N) of the grand coalition.
~b'e now state the following properties for share functions. First, a share function p on
CJ satisfies the efficienl shares property if the shares assigned to the players sum up
to one for all (iV, u) E G, i.e. ~;EN p;(1V', v) - 1. Second, p satisfies the null player
property t on ~ if for every (N, v) E~o and every null player i in (N, v) it holds that
p;(N, v) - 0. Third, p satisfies symmetry if for every (N, v) E G and every pair i, j of
symrnetric players ~ in (.N,v) it holds that p;(N,v) - p~(N,v). Finally, let. be given
sorne some real-valued function p: G -. 1R. Then p satisfies p-linearity on C~ if for every
pair of games (N, v), (N, w) E G and real numbers a, 6 such that (N, av f bw) E~ it
holds that 3 N~(1V, av -} bw)p(N, av ~- bw) - ap(N, u)p(N, v) ~ 6p(N, u.~)p(N, w).
The last property is a generalization of the familiar linearity property which is
obtained by taking p(N,v) - 1 for all (N,v) E~. A function p:G -~ IEt is called
positi~~e on C~ if p(:V, vo) - 0 and p(N, ~u) 1 0 for every (N, v) E Go. We call p li~aear
on Q if for every pair of games (.N, v), (N, w) E~ and real numbers a, 6 such that
(iV, au f bw) E~ it holds that p(N, au f 6w) - a~(N, v) t bp(N, w). Finally, we call p
symmetric on G if for every (N, v) E G, every pair of symrnetric players i, j in (N, u),
~ Player i E iV is a nult player in (;V, v) if v(E) - v(E`{i}) for all E C N. The null player property
is only assumed to hold on Qo, because in a nul] game (N, vo) irrespective of the shares all players get
a zero payoff whe.n multiplying the shares with vo(:V) - 0.
ZPlayers i, j E N are symmetric in (N,v) E G if v(E U{i}) - v(E U{j}) for all E C N with
E(1{i.j}-0.
3For a pair of games (N; v), (N, w) E G and real numbers a, 6, the game (N, av t 6w) is given by
(av t bw)(E) - av(E) t 6w(E) for all E C N.
5and every E C N such that {i, j} C E and (E ~{i},vF~{,}), (E ~{j},uE~h}) E C ~ it
holds that p(1~~ ~{i}. vE~t;l) - ft(E~ {j},t~E~{~}). The following result follows from van
der haan and van den Brink (1998).
Theorem 2.1
Gel p: G-~ ~ be positive, s~ym~metric ond linear on Q. "Then there exi.cts a uniqve share
function p" oa Cjsatisfying lhe property of ef~cient shares, the null player property,
syrnnzetry and p-linearity on CJ.
"fhe proof of the theorem goes along the lines of the proof of a slightly different result
in ~-an der Laan and van den Brink (1998), see also van den Brink and van der Laan
(1998).' Two specific examples of share functions are the Shnpley share functiorl and
the Baa~hoJ'sharefunction.
lletinition 2.2 (Shapley and Banzhaf share function)
(i) The Shapley share function ps oa ~ is deftned 6y ps(N,a) - `~~~'ywl, i E N,
(:V, u) E Go aad ps(N, v) - ~N~, i E N, mhen v - vo.
(ii) The Banzhaf share function pB o~a C is defined by p6(N,v) - `'B~~~wl -
~t~-" ~e V,v i E N, N,v E o and B N,v t i E N, when E~,vl~iE-i-~i~.l~~w~ (~ ), ( ) ~ n; ( ) - ~ Ni,
t~ - t.o.
In ~an dcr Laan and van den Brink (1998) it is shown that the unique share function
sati~fying the propert,ies stated in Theorem 2.1 is the Shapley share function when p
is defined as ps:C~ -~ IE2 given by p'(N,z) - v(N), respectively the Banzhaf share
function when p is defined as p~:G -~ ~ given by pB(N,v) - t Z,.-~ ~ecN(2~E~ -
rt)s(E).
For null games the concept. of share function is in itself not very interesting,
hecause in such a game any player gets a payoff of zero irrespective of the shares.
1.Ioreover, in many applications we may restrict ourselves to monotone non-null games.
Hotvever, in the next section we apply the concept of share functions to games in
~Observe that for a null garne ( N, vn) the axioms of symmetry and efficiency imply that for any N
we must have tha[ p','(A', vo) -~, for all i E.v.
6coalition structure. For such games the pa}'off of a player can be seen as the result of a
first level game between coalitions and a second level gamel between the players within
a coalition. In such a set-up we have to deal with null games, which may appear on
the second level, even when the game itself is a non-null game. Therefore we extended
the concept of share fiuictions to null games bc giving all players an equal share when
v - ua.
3 Coalition structure share functions
The share functions defined in the precious section yield a distribution of the worth
of the grand coalition reflecting the individual bargaining position of the players. [n
many situations however, it is reasonable to suppose that players forrn coalitions which
decide to act together against the other players in bargaining over r~(.'~'). In this section
we consider situations in which the pla}'ers are organized in a priori given coalition
structure.
~ coalition structure is a finite partition P-{Pt,...,P } of m non-empty,
disjoint subsets of the player set ;V, i.e. Uk-tPk -:V and Pk fl Pe - 0 for all k, 2 E
{ 1, ..., m}, k~ P. In the following the set of coalitions in the coalition structure is
denotcd by ,h~! -{ 1, ..., rn}. Eurtherrnore, a game (N, u) E~ in coalition structure
P is denoted by (N, a, P) and the collection of all coalition structures by P. The
collection of all monotone games in coalition structure is denoted by C~(~). A coalition
stnicture value (CS-value) function 4 on Ihe set C~(P) of games assigns a payoff to
any plat~er for every game in coalition structure (N, u, P) E r~(P). The Aumann-Drèze
value assigns to any player in a coalition P~ E P his Shapley value of the restriction
of the game (.V, r~) to Pk. Under this value concept, the total value of the players
within a coalition Pk is equal to the worth of this coalition. So, the players in Pk
ignore Ihe foregone opportunities of forming coalitions with the players not in Pk. As
alrcady argued by Aumann and Drèze, it is very reasonable that in many situations
also the outside opportunities of the mernbers of a coalition are taken into account.
IIart and Kurz (1983) argue that the existence of a coalition structure implies a two-
level interaction between tlre players. The outcome of such a two-level interaction isreflected b}' the CS-value introduced by Owen (1977). The Umen Coalition Structure
uatue (Owen CS-value) Bo on G(~) is defined by
o, ~L~!(m - ~L~ - 1)! (~F.~ - 1)!(~Pkl - IEU!
d~ (~, r~, P) - ~ ~
zcn~ ecP~ m! ~Pk~!
L~k E3~
(v(E U P(L)) - v((E ~{i}) U P(L))) , i E Pk, k E M, (1)
where P(G) - U~ELP~. We remark that the Owen CS-value reduces to the Shapley
value when P-{{:N}} or when P- {{i},i E N}. In fact, the weight assigned to
the rnarginal contribution of player i E E C Pk to the coalition P(L) U E, k~ L, is
the product of the Shapley weight of coalition Pk when k enters L and the Shapley
weight of player ~i when i enters coalition E C Pk. So, the weights reflect the fact that
first coalitions enter subsequently in a random order and that within each coalition the
players enter subsequently in a random order. P'ram thi~ it fullows that the Owen CS-
value has the property that the total payoff of the players in Pk is equal to the Shapley
value of coalition Pk in the first level game between the coalitions. More precisely, for
given game (N, u, P) E G(P), with P-{P~, ..., P}, M -{ 1, ..., m}, the m-player
game (.tif, vp) E G is defined by
vp(L) - v(P(L)), L C M,
i.e. for coalition structure P-{Pi,...,Pm}, the game (M,vp) is the rn-player game
beriveen the coalitions induced by the game (N, v, P). Observe that up(M) - v(.N).
~ow, let ~,k(.L1, vp) be the Shapley value assigned to coalition k, k E M, in the game
(~V1,up). Then, for all k E M, it follows from equation ( 1) by summing up over all
components i E Pk that ~,Epk Bo(,ti, v, P) -~k (iL1, up). Since by the efficiency of
the Shapley value ~keM'r~k(~L1,vp) - up(M) - v(N), it follows that also the Owen
CS-value is efficient.
The discussion above shows that the Owen CS-value can be considered as a di-
rect generalization of the Shapley value to games with coalition structure. The Owen
CS-value satisfies the consistency property that the total payoff to the players in a
coalition Pk is eyual to the payoff of player k when applying the same value concept to
8the m-player garne (iLf, v~, Q), being the induced game (:~YI, vY) in coalition structure
Q-{{.LI }}. For an axiomatization of the Owen CS-value we refer to Owen (1977),
Hart and Kurz (1983) and ~4'inter (1989). ~Vinter shows that the Owen CS-value is the
unique coalition structure value function satisfying the axioms of efficiency, null player
property, additivity with respect to any two games (,1~, v, P) and (.N, w, P) for given
P E~, the symmetric players property and coalitional symmetry. The latter property
means that when two coalitions P~ and Pk are symmetric players in the induced game
(rM1~, vY), then the total payoff of the players in coalition P~ is equal to the total pay-
off to the players in coalition Pk. Clearly this property is implied by the consistency
property and the symmetric players property.
Analogously to the generalization of the Shapley value, in the remaining of this section
we want to generalize the Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure by applying
the idea of share fuuctions as discussed in sectiou 2. There[ore we first define the Owen.
C.S-shure function as the share of player i. in the worth of v(tV) according to the Owen
CS-value, i.e. this is the function yio given by
0
ti;'(!~, v, P) - B~ (~V, r', P) i E Pk, k E.M11,
z'(~V~)
and reforrnulate the Owen CS-share of a player i as the procíuct of two Shapley shares.
Co do so. for L C.1f and k~ L we define the ~Pk~-player game (Pk,PP''~) by
r,f..~(~) - z.(Eu P(L)) - ~,(P(L)), E c Pk, (z)
i.e. the game (Pk, vP''r') assigns to each coalition E of P~ the marginal contributiou of
E to the union P(l.) of the coalitions P„ j E L. Furthermore, for k E:M1l, we define
the ~Pk~-player garne (Pk, vP") by




i.e. the game (Pk,vYk) is a weighted sum of the games ( Pk,uPk~~'), L C M, where
the weight of the game ( Pk, v~k'~) is equal to the Shapley weight assigned to coalition
k E a! if this coalition joins the collection L C:tif of coalitions. We now have the
9following ]emma, where ps(Pk,vPk) is the Shapley share of player i E Pk in the game
(Pk, uyk) and pk(NI,vP) the Shapley share of coalition Pk in the game (iLl,v~P).
Lemma 3.1
Let Ge giroen a game (N,v,P) E G(P) with P-{P~,...,Pm} and 37 -{1,...,m}.
Then the Owen CS-share of player i in Pk is equal to the product of the Shapley share
of player i in the game (Pk,vPk) and the Shapley share of coal~itio~ra k in the ganae
(M,uP), i.e.
:L~o(.V, v, P) - Pi (Pk~ vPk ) ' Pk (~l~l, vP), i E Pk, k E.M.
Proof.
From equations (2) and (3) it follows that
~~~(Pk} -~ ~t~~(m ~~~~ - i)~ („(Pk u P(L}} - v(P(L}})
L~M L~k
- ~ ~1~~(~` - ~~~ - i)~ wP({~} ~ L) -2~P(~)) m~
LCM
L7k





So, the value uPk(Pk) is equal to the Shapley value of coalition Pk in the game (M, vP).
lising the definition of the games (Pk,UPk'L) as given in equation (2), we now rewrite
eyuation (1) as
yo(w, v, P) - L ~ ~1~~(m -~L~ - f)~ (~E~ - 1)~(~PI ~- ~E~)~n`É(Pk vP`~L)
LCM ECPk
L~k E3i
~ ~G~!(rrz - ~G~ - 1)!~s(Pk
z Pk.L) i E Pk, k E M.
Lcnf ptt
L~Ik
I ()So, for gicen k E M, the Owen CS-value to player i E Pk is a weighted sum of the
Shapley values of player i in the games (Ik, vPk~L). Because of the linearity property
of the Shapley value it follows with (3) that
~o('~-. z', P) -~~(Pk, uP"), i E Pk, k E M.
From the equations (4) and (6) and the fact van v(N) - vP(M) we obtain that
o ~o(lti',V,P) ~s(Pk,z'~') v~k(Pk)
rG` (N'z7'P)- v(.v) - UPk(Pk) v(N)
~S(~i;,Z'Pk) ~k(~~,yP) s
P uPk s M,uP t E P k E:~1. - z pk(Pk) z p(~~) - P, ( k, )' Pk( ), k,
(6)
Considering the game (,19, vr) as the first level game between the coalitions in Y and
the game (Pk,z~P") as the game on the second level between the players in Pk, the
lernma shows that the Owen CS-share of player i in Pk is equal to the Shapley share
of player i in the second level game times the Shapley share of coalition Pk in the
first level game. We use this multiplicity property of the Owen CS-share function to
obtain a F3anzhaf-type coalition structure share function. To do so as a first step we
replace in equation (1) the two-level Shapley weights by the corresponding two-level
Banzhaf weights. In the Banzhaf value each marginal contribution has an equal weight.
Generalizing this to games in coalition structure we have to assign equal weights to
each marginal contribution of a coalition within the coalition structure and within
such a coalition equal weights to each marginal contribution of the players within that
coalition. Doing so, we obt.ain the value function ~ on C~(~) defined by
B~( ~-, z~. P) -~ ~ 2-(m-r) . Z-U~kI-~) (v(E u P(L)) - v((E ~{i}) U P(L)))
f.C.N ECPk
L ik E3i




11Analogously to the second part of equation (5) this reduces to
B;(N, v~ P) - ~ 2-l~`-~14~8(Pk,
vP..L) i E Pk, k E M, (S)
LCTf
L~k
i.e. the value of a player i E Pk is a weighted sum of the Banzhaf values of player i in
the games (Pk,vPk~L), k E M. Since the Banzhaf value is linear it follows that
y~(1V, a, f') - 4~B(Pk, UP` ), i E Pk, k E Ni, (g)
where the ~Pk~-Player game (Pk, i~Pk), k E M, is defined by
~rk(E) - ~ 2-(m-ilvPk.L(E) E C Pk. (10)
LCM
L~k
Observe that analogously to the game (Pk.vPk), the game (Pk,vPk) is a weighted sum
of the games (Pk,vpk~L), L C.~bl, where the weight of the game (Pk,vPk~L) is equal to
the Banzhaf weight assigned to coalition k E M if this coalition joins the collection
L C tiI of coalitions.
The Banzhaf-type value B;(:V, v, P) as defined in equation (9) is similar to the
expression of the Owen CS-value as given in equation (6). However, the Banzhaf value
is not efficient and so is not the value function B on C~(P) as defined above. Moreover,
B is not consistent in the sense that 0 does not satisfy the property that the total value
of the players in a coalition Pk is equal to the Banzhaf value of coalition Pk in the
game (tLI, uP). However, by applying a similar multiplicity property as satisfied by the
Owen CS-share function we can define a two-level normalization of ~ as an efficient
and consistent Baazhaf CS-shore ftmction. Therefore, let p~(Pk, vYk ) be the Banzhaf
share of player i E Pk in the game (Pk,vPk) and let pB(M,vv) be the Banzhaf share
of coalition Pk in the game (M, vP). Then analogously to the nmltiplicity property of
the Owen CS-share function we define a Banzhaf-type CS-share function on Q(P).
Definition 3.2 (Banzhaf Coalition Structure share function)
Í'he. Banzhaf Coalition Structure share function is the function ~B on G(~)
yir~en by
~''B(,~~, v~ P) - PB(Pk, vPk) - PB(M, v~), i E Pk, k E M.
12Thus, the Banzhaf CS-share of player i in Pk is defined as the the Banzhaf share of
playcr i in the second level gacne (Pk, vPk ) between the players in Pk times the Banzhaf
share of coalition Pk in the first level game (.M, vv) between the coalitions in P. Clearlv.
multiplying this share with the worth v(~V) of the grand coalition we obtain a CS-value
function satisfying both the efficiency and the consistency property. More precisely we
have the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3 (Efficiency and consistency properties)
Efi"iciencY: ~,E.~. t~H(.~, t:, P) - 1.
Consistency:
Íi) ~~eF'k ~~(N, v, Y) - PB(M, vP).
(ii) t!~B( ~V, v, P) - pB( N, v) when P-{{N}}.
(iii) v~A(IV',v, P) - pA(N,v) when P-{{i}, ~i E N}.
'Che first consistency property says that the sum of the Banzhaf CS-shares of the players
in a coalition Pk is equal to the Banzhaf share of coalition Pk in the game (.M, vP) and
follows immediately from the definition of zlig. The last two consistency properties
say that the Banzhaf CS-share function is equal to the Banzhaf share function when
P -{{iV}} or when P-{{i}, i E N} and follow immediately from the fact that in
these cases one of the two shares in the product is equal to one. So, ~B can be seen as
a generalization of the Banzhaf share function p~ to games in coalition structure.
:~ccording to the properties of the Banzhaf share function the Banzhaf CS-share
fuuction satisfies also the null player property and the symmetry property. So a null
player receives a share equal to zero, but also the sum of the shares of the players
in a coalition being a null player in the game (:YI,aP) is equal to zero. Also the
symmetry property holds for both two symmetric players within the same coalition
and for two symmetric coalitions in the game (M1l, uP). The Banzhaf CS-share function
is not additive. However, for given (N, v, P) and (.~', w, P), let (N, z, P) be given by
~- z, -} rn. Then we have that ZP - UP f eiP and that for k E~t'f it holds that
zP" - i~Pk -}- io~k. Since according to 'I'heorem 2.1 the Banzhaf share function is pB-
linear, it follows that the Banzhaf CS-share of player i E Pk in the game (iV, z, P) can be
computed when we know his Banzhaf CS-shares in the games (Pk,vPk) and (Pk,wP')
13and the Banzhaf shares of coalition Pk in the games (!Vl,vY) and (M,wP). So, the
Banzhaf CS-share function satisfies the axioms of efficiency, null player property, the
symmetric players property, coalitional symmetry property and can be decomposed
into tw.o te~-additive share frmctions. From Theorem 2.1 it follows straightlorwardlv
that the Banzhaf CS-share function is the unique CS-share function satisfying all these
properties.
4 CS-share functions for simple games
In this section we consider the class of simple games. A game is called simple if
c~(E) E{0. 1} for any E C N. In a simple game a coalition is called winning when
its value equals one and losing otherwise. An example of suc:h a game is a weighted
voting game, in which a coalition has the power to decide, and hence is winning, when
it holds a certain number of votes. In such games it is common practice that the grand
coalition will not form. For example, in parliament usually not the grand coalition
;~' -{ l, ..., n} of all parties will form, but a coalition of parties just having enough
seats to take the majority. However, in forming such a winning or majority coalition
often the questíon arises about the relative power of each party within the coalition.
For instance, in the Dutch parliamentary system the parties in a majority coalition
C C ~ti' forming the government not only have to agree on issues, but also on the
cíivision of the rninistries between the governmental parties. This division is usually
based on the number of seats within the coalition, i.e. the payoff to party i E C(in
terms of ministries occupied by this party) is proportional to its number oF seats within
the coalition. Another rule to determine the number of ministries of each party in the
majority coalition could be the Aumann-Drèze value of the original game restricted
to the majority coalition C. Because in this case a(C) - v(lV) - 1, we have indeed
that the .1U-values of the players in C sum up to one. However, in both cases the
division over the parties doe~s not take into account the opportunities of the majority
parties of breaking away and forming another majority coalition with parties not in C.
To reftect these opportunities in determining the relative power of the governmental
parties within the coalition we may consider the Owen and Banzhaf CS-share functions.
14To do so we have to consider the question about the coalition structure with respect
to the parties outside the majority coalition forming the governrnent.
~~~e consider a weighted voting game (:~',z) in which each player has a number
of votes or seats, for instance each player represents a party in parliament. Let the
integer number s„ i E N, be the nutnber of votes of player i. A coalition has the
majority (is wínning) if it has at least some prespecified integer number W' ~ 2~,E,~, s,
of votes. So, the game is proper, i.e. when E C.1' is a majority coalition having value
1, then the complement i1' ~ E is losing. Moreover, for an}' subset F of ,ti' ~ E we have
that a(F) - 0 and n(E U F) - L Observe that in general there are many winning
coalitions.
Let C be a majority coalition and suppose that the members of C indeed agree
to cooperate, for instance in forming the government. To assign the CS-shares to
each pla}~er (i.e. each party in the parliament) when C is formed, we may consider
two opposite possibilities with respect to the coahtion structure of the part~es outside
C'. The first possibilit}' is that all pla}~ers not in C stay alone and do not cooperate
together. In this case we have the coalition structure P-{C, {h}hEN`c} of m-
n- ~C~ ~- 1 coalitions, namely the majority coalition C and the n- ~C~ parties not in
C. The opposite situation is that the members not in C join together in order to fornt
an as powerful as possible opposition against C. This yields the coalition structure
Q-{C. :~` ~ C'} of m- 2 coalitions.
~~'e hrst consider coalition structure P. Let h be a player not in C. Since C
is winuing wc have that {h} is a null player in the induced game (:~I,riP) and hence
rr'~(.~~, c, P) -;.B(:~', a, P) - 0. So any player outside C has zero power within the
coalition structure P. Consequently it follows that for both the Banzhaf and Owen
CS-share function the share of coalition C in the game (M,wY) is equal to one, i.e.
Pc(.ll, c~f') - PB(:~h zP) - 1.
In case of the E3anzhaf CS-share function it follows for i E C that ~a(N, v, P) -
pe(C. i~) with the garne (C, á) as the game (Pk, vPk) as defined in equation (10) with
Pk - C, i.e. (C, u) is a weighted sum of all ~C~-player games (C, vC~~ ), L C N`C,
given b}'
r,L.L(E) - U(L U E) - U(L) - 71(L U E), E C C.
]jRernark that L C íV`C is losing and thus v(L) - 0. Now, due to the coalition structure
P-{C, {h}hEN`~} equation ( 7) reduces for i E C to






So, the Banzhaf value ~!s(C, v)- B;(.N, v, P), see equation (9), of a player i E C in
the game (C, v) is the weigthed sum of all his marginal contributions with all weights
eyual to 2-t"-i) and thus,
~B(C, r~) - s~B(N, v), i E C,
i.e. the Banzhaf value of a player i E C in the game (C,v ) is equal to the Banzhaf
value in the game (N, v} without coalition structure. The only difference is that in the
coalition stucture game the value of the players outside C is zero, while they may have
positive value in the game without coalition structure. Normalizing the values of the
players in C to one we obtain that
B N, v
vB(N, v, P) - PB(C, v)- P' ( B ) when i E C,
~iecP~ (~~,v)~
with pB(.1', v) the Banzhaf share function of the game (N, v). So, under the coalition
structure P the Banzhaf CS-share or power of the members within the majority coali-
tiou C follows immediately from normalizing the Banzhaf shares of the members of the
coalition iu the game without coalition structure to one. When applying this result
to the problern of determining the number of ministries to each party in a winning
governmental coalition C of the parliament we simply obtain that the number of min-
istries occupied by a party i E C should approximately be equal to o~l'v'~) times
iec o~ IN.r,)
the number of ministries, which gives a simple rule for the distribution of the number
of ministries over the parties in the coalition. Observe that this distribution may differ
considerably from the usual distribution as mentioned in the beginning of this section.
In general the distribution proportional to the number of seats in the parliament is in
favor of the smaller parties within the government.
16[n case of the Owen CS-share we get for i E C. that ~o(N,v,P) - ps(C,,v~)
with the game (C,v~) as the game ( P~,vPk) defined in equation (3) with Pk - C,
i.e. (C, v~) is a weighted sum of all ICI-player games (C, vC~L), L C N`C. So,
the Owen CS-share of a player i E C is a weighted surn of the 5hapley shares oE
the ICI-player garnes (C,v~~L), L C N`C. Looking to the weights of the marginal
contributions of the players, remark that the Owen CS-value funetion is efilcient and
that v(N) - L Therefore we also have that ~o(N, v, P) - Bo(N, v, P) and due to
the coalition structure P- {C, {h}hE,v~e}, the formula for Bo(N, v, P) as given in
equation ( 1) reduces for i E C to
ILI~(n - ICI - ILI)~ (IEI - I)~(ICI - IEI)~ ~ ,
Bo(N,v,P)- ~ ~ m' (~ti,v)
LCN`CECC (n - ICI ~ I)~ IG`II
LuE
Hence, for i E C the Owen CS-share is a weighted sum of all marginal contributions
of player i. Howevet, due to the coalition structure the weights differ from the stan-
dard Shapley weights of the margrnal contributions. Therefore, for : E C.', genencally
ep~(:V, v, P) ~ v ~ v'"~ Consequently, the Owen CS-shares of the players in C do
)EC pJ ~~V~v).
not follow from normalizing the sum of the Shapley shares in the game (N, v) of the
players in C to one, as is the case for the Banzhaf CS-shares. This maybe makes the
Owen CS-share function less attractive compared to the Banzhaf CS-shares for sim-
ple games with a coalition structure containing one majority coalition and the other
players as singletons. In fact, analogously to the formula for 8o(N, v, P) as given in
equation (ï i) it follows that
Oo(N,2,. P) -~ ILI~(n - IcI - ILI)~ s c,L O (~n - ICI -}- 1)~ `p, (C, v ), i E C. 11
Lcw`c
So, ihe Owen CS-shares are a weighted sum of the Shapley shares in the games (C, vc.L)
!, C a' ` C. We summarize the results stated above in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Let (N,v) E G 6e a simple game and fet P -{C, {h}hEn~`c} 6e a
coalition structure with C C N a~rnajority coalition. 'lhen the Banzhaf CS-shares are
gii~ea by
-( vBlw'v~ if i E C,
~,B(N, U, P) (Il lEC P] (N~v~t
0 ifi~C.
17The Owen C.S-shares are given 6y
~~c,v c
f~l'(n-Icl-Ir-U!~s(C uc.r,), if 2 E C, ty'Q(.~', L', P) - ~ " t~-~c~~l)~
0 ifi~C.
Example 4.2
l1'e consider a weigthed majority game ( V, v) with N-{ 1, 2, 3, 4}. The number
of votes is given by s- (7,4,'2,1) with s; the number of votes of player i E w.
Eight votes are needed t,o have the majority. Hence v(S) - 1 if 1 E S and ~S~ ~'l,
u(5') - 0 otherwise. Without coalition structure the Shapley and 13anzhaf shares of
S 3 I I 1 T B 7 I 1 1 T thc players arc given by p (N,v) -(q, ~~, 1z, 12) and p(N,v) -(~o~ ro~ ro~ io) .
For the game in coalition structure P-{{1,'2}, {3}, {4}}, the Banzhaf CS-shares
are zcro for the players 3 and ~1. For the players 1 and 2 these shares follow from
normalizing the surn of the Banzhal shares of the players 1 and '2 to one. Hence
~~(:~', v, P) -(e, 8, 0, 0)T. Also the Owen CS-shares are zero for the players 3 and
4. The Owen CS-shares of the players 1 and 2 are a weighted sum of their Shapley
shares in the four '2-player games (C,vc~L) with C-{1,2} the majority coalition
and L C{3,4}. The characteristic functions of these games and the Shapley shares
of the two players in these garnes are given in Table 1. With formula (11) it follows
that the Owen CS-shares of the players 1 and '2 are equal to s, respectively s, so that.
wo(:1', v. P) -(s, ~, 0, 0)T. Observe that
p:z(,V, v) 1 1 rhz(N, v. P)
Pi (.V, u) ~~~~~ 2Uo(N~, v, P)
and that
p~~(.1". v) 1 i~.~(.1~, v, P)
p,~(.V. ~~) - 7- ~!~,~(.ti', v, P) ~
4Ve now consider coalition structure Q-{C, ,ti `C} of two coalitions. Let C be
the first player in the induced game (91, vQ) and let .N `C be the second player in this
game. Since v(C) - v(N) - 1 and v(N ~ C) - 0 we have that the coalition !~' ~ C' is a
185 ~ {l,Z} U
, l~1
l I
,ti . 3 (.~~ ~ '.4 (S) ,~ , 3A (~)
~ O O O O I
{1} ~ 1 I I
{2} 0 0 0 0
{1.2} 1 1 1 1
y~i z 1 ] 1
~:Z ' 0 0 0
Table 1: Characteristic functions and Shapley shares
r~ull player in the game (M, vQ ) and henee pz (1V7, va )- p8(M, uQ )- 0, sa that the sum
of the shares of the players not in C is equal to zero. 5ince all marginal contributions
are nonnegative and in both the Banzhaf CS-share fLmction and the Owen CS-share
function the weights of these contributions are nonnegative, it follows immediately that
each player gets a nonnegative share. I~Ience, ~o(N,v,Q) -~B(N,v,Q) - 0 for all
i~ C. Consequcntly it also follows that pl(i11,v4) - p~(Nl,v4) - 1, i.e. for both
the Banzhaf and O~~~en CS-share function the sum of the shares of the players in the
winning coalition C is equal to one.
In case of the Owen CS-share function we get for i E C that tfio(N, v, Q) -
p;'(C, i~c) with the game (C, vc) as the game (Pk, vPk) defined in the equation (3) with
f'~ - C. Since the O~i~en CS-value function is efficient and because v(1V) - 1, it follows
that p,'(C,ac) - y~~(C,vc) - Bo(N,v,~), i E C. Due to the coalition structure
Q-{C, :~- ~ C}, the formula for Bo(N, v, P) as given equation (1) reduces for i E C
to
5~~s(C, vc) - ~ ~ . (~E~ - 1)~~~~ ~ - ~E~)~~E(N ~) ~
Ecc




f~- 2y~s(C vc~~0) f 2~S(C,vc~N~c), i E C,
where vc~0(E) - v(E), E C C and vc~~~c(E) - v(E U(N ~ C)), E C C. Bence
the Owen CS-value of a player i E C rmder coalition structure Q is the mean of the
two Shapley values of i in the games (C, vc'0) and (C, vc~'ti~c). In the first game we
consider all marginal contributions of a player i E C to coalitions not containing any
of the players outside C, in the second game we consider all marginal contributions of
a player i E C to coalitions containing all the players not in C. Observe that both
Shapley values get an equal weight 2. Since also vC.O(C) - vc~'ti~c(C.) - 1, in both
games the Shapley values are equal to the Shapley shares and we finally obtain that
z"o(-v, z', Q) - ~Ps(C. uc,e) -F Zps(C, z~c.nr~c) i E C,
so that the Owen CS-share is the mean of the two Shapley shares.
In case of the Banzhaí CS-share function we get for i E C that ~~d(N, v, Q) -
pe(C, u) with the game (C, v) as the game (Pk, vPk) as defined in equation (10)
with P - C. Clearl B C,v - "B~c~~
~ y, p, (~ )- h c~h~c~tict, z E C. Using the special forrn
of t.he coalition structure and observing t~iat m- 2 it follows that the expression of
the unnormalized Banzhaf CS-value y~B(C,v )- B,(,'V,v,Q) as given in equation (8)
recluces to
YB(C, i~) - ~ 1 ~-(Icl-r)~iF(N v)~ ~ 1 .2-(Icl-r)mé(-N~v)
Ec~ ~~ V ,v`ccE 2
Zy~B(C vc,e) f 24~;~(C~r~c'~~c), i E C.
So, the unnormalized Banzhaf CS-value of a player i E C under coalition structure
Q is the rnean of the two Banzhaf values of i in the games (C, vc~0) and (C, vc,iv`c)
The Banzhaf CS-shares of the players in C follow by normalizing the sum of the values
Y~('C, u), i E C, to one, which results in
~,B(:V,v,Q) - PB(C,v ) - pe(C v )S~B(C,v ) -
- pg(C,v ) r 2pB(C'vC,e)pe(C vc.e) } 2pe(C vc„v`c)pe(C vc.N`c)~
201 A C0 A C
2{~A(C,v )
~F~ (C,v ~ )Pi (G,V ~~0) ~ }(B(C
VC,N~C)~B(~r ~C.N~C~~
So, the Banzhaf CS-share is a weighted sum of the two Banzhaf shares with the weights
determined by the values of function ~A. Since the Owen CS-shares are simply the
mean of the two Shapley shares this maybe makes the Banzhaf CS-share function less
attractive compared to the Owen CS-shares for simple games with a coalition structure
consisting of one majority coalition and one opposing coalition containing the other
players. :lgain the results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3 Let (N, v) E~ be a simple game and let Q-{C, N`C} be a coalition
str-uchnre milh C C.V a majority coalition. Then lhe Owen CS-shares are given b~
t';'(-V, r~, Q) -~ ~~~(C,
z,c.e) ~ ~~s(C ~cc.rr~c), if i E C,
0 ifi~C.
The Bnnzhaf CS-shares are gii~en b~
-~ B C,0 ~ C,0 B C,N`C B C,N`C) y (C,v )p (C,v )}y (C,u )p (C,u
~.~g(.`'. i~. Q) sug(c.,, ) , if Z E C,
0 ifi~C.
Observe that analogously to the formula for the Banzhaf CS-shares the Owen CS-shares
can also be written as
- ~ {,S(C.vC.O)PS(C`.t,C.O)f45(C,vC.N`C)p5(CvC.N`C)
~( ) ifiEC,
i~o(.V, v, Q) ~ s ~.v ~
0 ifi~C.
Since les(C, cc.0) -~s(C vc,.ti~~c) - ps(G, u )- 1 and because for simple games the
Shaplcy share function is eyual to the Shapley value function this expression reduces
to the expression as given in the theorem.
Example 4.4
4~'e consider again the weigthed majority game (N, v) of Example 4.`2 and now consider
the coalition structure. Q-{{1,2}, {3,4}}. .4gain the Owen and Banzhaf CS-shares
21are zero for the players 3 and 4. The Owen CS-shares of the players 1 and 2 are the
mean of their Shapley shares of thc two '2-player games (C, v~~0) and (C, v~"~~~~) with
C-{1,2}. Frorn Table 1 it follows immediately that the Owen CS-shares of the
players 1 and 2 are equal to á, respectively á, so that rl~o(N,v,Q) -(4, 4, 0, 0)r.
Analogously the unnormalized Banzhaf values of the players 1 and '2 are the mean of
their unnormalized Banzhaf values in the two `L-player games (C, v~~e) and (C, vc..v`r)
with C- { l. L}. Since for two player games the unnormalized Banzhaf value is equal
to the 5hapley value, in this case the unnormalized Banzhaf value is efficient and hence
it follows immediately that also ~B(.V,a,Q) - (4, 4, 0, 0)T.
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